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Abstract
This article presents reflections on Brazilian Constitution-
al Amendment 95/2016, which established the New Tax 
Regime and consequently the ceiling of public spending 
in Brazil for a period of twenty years, which has serious 
consequences for Brazilian public services. The hypoth-
esis defended in the study is that Amendment 95/2016 
is an unconstitutional constitutional amendment, since 
it violates the essence of the Social State present in the 
original text of the 1988 Constitution and has direct in-
fluences on the guarantee of fundamental rights, which 
constitute stone clauses (cláusulas pétreas). Thus, the 
study starts with the technical analysis of the Amend-
ment. Next, the concept and content of the stone clauses 
in the Brazilian constitution are analyzed to propose the 
Resumo
O presente artigo apresenta reflexão acerca da Emenda 
Constitucional n. 95/2016, que estabeleceu o Novo Regime 
Fiscal e, com ele, o teto de gastos públicos no Brasil pelo 
período de vinte anos, o que traz consequências graves aos 
serviços públicos brasileiros. A hipótese defendida no estu-
do é de que a EC n. 95/2016 é uma emenda constitucional 
inconstitucional, uma vez que viola a essência de Estado So-
cial presente no texto original da Constituição de 1988 e tem 
influências diretas na garantia de direitos fundamentais, 
que constituem cláusulas pétreas. Assim, parte-se da aná-
lise técnica da referida Emenda. Em seguida, são analisados 
o conceito e o conteúdo das cláusulas pétreas na constitui-
ção brasileira para se propor a possibilidade de controle de 
convencionalidade como alternativa, com foco no Pacto de 
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1. INTRODUCTION
The project established by the Brazilian Constitution of 1988 is of a social State, 
focused on the guarantees of fundamental rights and the protection of human dignity. 
Indeed, thanks, inter alia, to the social demands of many organized groups of civil so-
ciety during the constitution-making,1 the Constitution ensures a broad commitment 
to social rights. We learn this from the Preamble, from the fact that “social values” is 
one of the constitution’s fundamental principles (art. 1, IV); for the constitution’s central 
purpose “to eradicate poverty and substandard living conditions and to reduce social 
and regional inequalities” (art. 3, III); and from the broad constitutional entrenchment of 
social rights (Title I, Ch. II) and the constitutional regulation of the state’s social order in 
which everyone is granted, among others, the right to public health care, to education 
and to social assistance and security (Title VIII). Through the original constitutional text, 
the structure of the State compromises to an ideal of providing public services and 
attention to the citizen. It has also imposed a number of unamendability clauses, called 
cláusulas pétreas, that constrain the Legislative’s power to formally change the Consti-
tution by establishing certain themes that cannot be abolished from the original text.2 
1  BENVINDO, Juliano Zaiden. The Forgotten people in Brazilian constitutionalism: Revisiting behavior strate-
gic analyses of regime transitions. International Journal of Constitutional Law, vol. 15, n. 2, p. 332-357, 2017. 
p. 352.
2  DALY, Tom Gerald. The Alchemists: Questioning our Faith in Courts as Democracy-Builders. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017. p. 185-186. On constitutional unamendability, more generally, see 
ROZNAI, Yaniv. Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments – The Limits of Amendment Powers. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2017.
possibility of conventionality control as an alternative, 
focusing on the Intermerican Convention on Human 
Rights, UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Dis-
abilities and International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights. It is concluded that conventionality 
control of the Amendment is imperative. The methodol-
ogy used is the bibliographic analysis on the themes, as 
well as the projection of data on the economic and social 
effects of Amendment 95/2016.
Keywords: conventionality control; Brazilian Constitu-
tional Amendment 95/2016; ceiling of public spend-
ing; stone clauses; unconstitutional constitutional 
amendment. 
San José da Costa Rica, Convenção da ONU sobre os direitos 
das pessoas com deficiência e no Pacto Internacional sobre 
os Direitos Econômicos, Sociais e Culturais. Conclui-se pela 
necessidade de controle de convencionalidade da Emenda. 
A metodologia empregada é a análise bibliográfica sobre 
os temas, bem como da projeção de dados sobre os efeitos 
econômicos e sociais da EC n. 95/2016.
Palavras-chaves: controle de convencionalidade; Emenda 
Constitucional n. 95/2016; teto de gastos; cláusulas pétreas; 
emenda constitucional inconstitucional.
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However, Constitutional Amendment 95 of December 2016 has changed such 
characteristics. Establishing a New Tax Regime, the amendment imposes a ceiling on 
public expenditures and prevents the expansion of investments in sectors such as heal-
th and education for twenty years. In other words, until the year 2036, public spending 
on public services will be frozen in Brazil. Beginning in 2017, the maximum possible 
variation for public spending corresponds to inflation for the year. 
The present study aims to demonstrate that the Amendment 95 is an uncons-
titutional constitutional amendment and, as an alternative, intends to defend that it 
can be the object of conventionality control. On the basis of international human ri-
ghts conventions to which Brazil is a signatory, in particular the United Nations Con-
vention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the Inter-American Convention 
on Human Rights (Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica), the intention is to demonstrate that 
the amendment in question violates not only the Brazilian constitutional project, but 
also international commitments ratified by the country. Therefore, these constitutional 
changes can be the object of conventionality control as an alternative to the ordinary 
constitutionality control.
The structure of the research is divided as follows: initially, we analyse Amend-
ment 95, and briefly review the changes it brings about for public spending in Brazil; 
then we examine the amendment vis-à-vis the formal constitutional unamendability of 
the cláusulas pétreas, and argue how Amendment 95/2016 violates these clauses and 
can therefore be considered “unconstitutional”; finally, we propose an alternative to the 
constitutional scrutiny based upon control of the conventionality of the amendment.
2. AMENDMENT 95 AND THE “NEW TAX REGIME” IN BRAZIL
Brazil approved the Amendment 95 in December 2016, giving the Act of Tran-
sitional Constitutional Provisions a new writing: from that moment on, the country de-
clared a “New Tax Regime” and all public expenses were frozen for 20 years. On the one 
hand, as the amendment violates the principles of prohibition on social setbacks, it is 
arguably an unconstitutional constitutional amendment. On the other hand, Amend-
ment 95’s main purpose is to limit the public expenses as a way to balance the go-
vernment’s funds and to relax the consequences of the economic malfunction effects 
(diagnosed as endemic) in the Federal Administration.3
The consequences of this Constitutional Amendment reach all the Powers of the 
Union and the federal agencies with administrative and financial autonomy, members 
3  VALLE, Vanice Regina Lírio do. Novo Regime Fiscal, autonomia financeira e separação de poderes: uma 
leitura em favor de sua constitucionalidade. Revista de Investigações Constitucionais, Curitiba, vol. 4, n. 1, p. 
227-258, jan./abr. 2017. p. 234. For a recent collection of studies on the political economy of Brazil see, SCHNEI-
DER, Ben Ross (Ed.) New Order and Progress: Development and Democracy in Brazil. Oxford and New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2016. 
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of the Fiscal Budget and of the social security. The idea is to limit the primary expenses 
of an exercise to the value of the previous year, corrected by the variation of the Na-
tional Extended Consumer Price Index (IPCA, in Portuguese). This new tax regime will 
last 20 years, starting in 2017, with the possibility of an Executive’s amendment of the 
method of correcting the limits as of the 10th fiscal year. It is important to note that the 
government makes two types of expenditures: the primary and the payment of interest 
and the amortization of public debt. The primary ones are those spent on health, edu-
cation, welfare, social assistance, culture, national defense, etc. The amendment only 
considers primary expenditure as the adjustment variable. The expenses with interest 
payments and public debt amortization have been left out of the limitation.4
The new regime fixed until the year of 2036 the ceiling of the state’s expen-
ses. The total budget for 2017 corresponds to the available budget for the expenses 
of 2016, plus the inflation that year. For expenses related to education and health the 
Amendment will start operating in 2018 and the base year is 2017 (meaning that the 
expenses for 2018 can be up to 2017’s budget plus the year’s inflation). Any change in 
the rules can only be made in a ten-year time from the Amendment’s writing and shall 
be limited to the amendment of the annual correction index. This measure aims to keep 
Brazil under a permanent state of economic exception.5
 For each year there is an individualized limit for total primary expenses of 
the Executive, Judiciary and Legislative Powers, as well as other public offices (such as 
the Public Defender’s Office). State’s social security budgets are also affected by the 
Amendment. This means that for each tributary exercise, individual limits for primary 
expenditure are set out. The only change that can be granted between one year and 
the next is the inflation correction. The opening of additional or special credit to ex-
pand the total amount of primary expenditure is prohibited, unless there are cuts on 
other areas to compensate for these changes.
Therefore, the new regime’s rules do not allow the growth of the government’s 
expenses above inflation, not even if the economy is doing well. This is what differentia-
tes the Brazilian case from other foreign experiences that adopted the limitation of pu-
blic spending. It will only be possible to increase investments in one area if other areas 
make cuts on their budgets. The new rules disregard rates of economic growth, as well 
as demographic growth rates for the next twenty years, which could lead to the scra-
pping of social policies, especially in the areas of health and education.6 For example, 
4  ROCHA, Flávia Rebecca Fernandes; MACÁRIO, Epitácio. O impacto da EC 95/2016 e da PEC 287/2016 para a 
Previdência Social brasileira. SER Social, Brasília, v. 18, n. 39, p. 444-460, jul.-dez./2016. p. 447.
5  MARIANO, Cynara Monteiro. Emenda constitucional 95/2016 e o teto dos gastos públicos: Brasil de volta 
ao estado de exceção econômico e ao capitalismo do desastre. Revista de Investigações Constitucionais, 
Curitiba, vol. 4, n. 1, p. 259-281, jan./abr. 2017. p. 259.
6  SOUZA, Luis Eugenio Portela Fernandes de. The right to health in Brazil: A Constitutional guarantee threat-
ened by fiscal austerity. Journal of Public Health Policy, vol. 38, n. 4, p. 493-502, nov. 2017. p. 493–502. On the 
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it is predicted that the amendment will bring about a reduction of public spending per 
capita on health care, from 519 reals per person in 2016 to 411 reals per person in 2036 
(taking into account that in 2036 it is predicted that the elderly population with double 
itself ).7 It privileges the payment of public debts over the maintenance of public poli-
cies and social programs, in an antidemocratic economic structure.8
For proponents of its constitutionality, Amendment 95 would be a temporary 
discipline, aimed at facing a moment of fiscal crisis. The major problems of the new tax 
regime lie in the possibility of payment of interest and amortizations of the public debt, 
which may freely increase – these expenses were not excluded from the ceiling. 9
The new art. 103 of the Transitional Constitutional Provisions Act further pro-
vides that, in the event of non-compliance with the expenditure limit, the following 
measures will be applied to the power or body in the following financial year: a) to the 
granting of an advantage, increase or readjustment of remuneration, except those de-
rived from a judicial decision or from a legal determination prior to the new tax regime; 
b) the creation of a position, job or function that implies an increase in expenses; c) the 
change of career structure that implies an increase in expenses; d) the admission or 
hiring of personnel, except for the replacement of managerial and management posi-
tions that do not entail an increase in expenses and those resulting from vacancies of 
effective positions; and (e) public procurement. In addition, the granting of tax exemp-
tions will be prohibited. 
The beginning of this regime lies on the political incapacity of the post-neoliberal 
governments of Lula and Dilma to break with the cycle of interest payments and public 
debt amortization, subordinated to the interests of financial capital. The consequence is 
that the 1988 constitutional project of the Welfare State found its limit in the system of 
protection of the right to health in Brazil, see: MAAS, Rosana Helena; LEAL, Mônia Clarissa Hennig. Modalidades 
de judicialização da saúde: análise na jurisprudência do STF. A&C – Revista de Direito Administrativo & Con-
stitucional, Belo Horizonte, ano 17, n. 69, p. 149-167, jul./set. 2017. DOI: 10.21056/aec.v17i69.355; PINTO, Élida 
Graziane; BAHIA, Alexandre Melo Franco de Moraes; SANTOS, Lenir. O financiamento da saúde na Constituição 
de 1988: um estudo em busca da efetividade do direito fundamental por meio da equalização federativa do 
dever do seu custeio mínimo. A&C – Revista de Direito Administrativo & Constitucional, Belo Horizonte, 
ano 16, n. 66, p. 209-237, out./dez. 2016. DOI: 10.21056/aec.v16i66.366; DEZAN, Sandro Lucio; BRASIL JÚNIOR, 
Samuel Meira. A juridicidade do Estado-administração na concretização de políticas públicas de saúde – Um 
método para a justificação da eficácia horizontal dos direitos fundamentais. A&C – Revista de Direito Admin-
istrativo & Constitucional, Belo Horizonte, ano 16, n. 63, p. 211-238, jan./mar. 2016.
7  BERTOTTI, Bárbara Marianna de Mendonça Araújo. Constitutional amendment 95/2016 and the limit 
for public expenses in Brazil: amendemnt or dismemberment?. Presented at the “Constitutionalism in a 
Plural World” Conference, Universidade Católica Portuguesa, Porto. November 22, 2017 (copy with authors). 
8  MARIANO, Cynara Monteiro. Emenda constitucional 95/2016 e o teto dos gastos públicos: Brasil de volta 
ao estado de exceção econômico e ao capitalismo do desastre. Revista de Investigações Constitucionais, 
Curitiba, vol. 4, n. 1, p. 259-281, jan./abr. 2017. p. 261.
9  MARIANO, Cynara Monteiro. Emenda constitucional 95/2016 e o teto dos gastos públicos: Brasil de volta 
ao estado de exceção econômico e ao capitalismo do desastre. Revista de Investigações Constitucionais, 
Curitiba, vol. 4, n. 1, p. 259-281, jan./abr. 2017. p. 266.
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public debt, which today is a constraint on the Constitution and on public services. The 
Amendment 95/2016 is a translation and a deepening, therefore, of this debt system.10
The Amendment 95/2016 is consequently a measure of fiscal adjustment that 
meets the logic imposed by the neoliberal consensus for underdeveloped or deve-
loping nations, which can be synthesized on the tripod “primary surplus, inflation 
target and floating exchange rate”, whose result is already known: deepening social 
inequality and economic recession and generating exclusive and exorbitant profits 
for very few.11
This constitutional change represents, after all, the reaction of the conservative 
political and economic sectors of Brazilian society, who never accepted a constitution 
that intended to establish a Social State in Brazil, determining the social function of 
property, the intervention of the State in the economic and social spheres. In fact, they 
have never accepted the role of the country in the strategic exploitation of its natural 
resources, as demonstrated by the successive approvals to Bill No. 4567/16, by José 
Serra, the current Minister of Foreign Affairs.12
Aimed at imposing a limit on primary expenditures, the amendment aims to 
garner funds for services of interest to the most vulnerable sections of the population 
in order to guarantee resources for the payment of interest on debt, which, by the way, 
is the true origin of the Brazilian budget deficit. This measure goes hand in hand with 
maintaining one of the highest interest rates in the world - which favors the financial 
sector and, above all, holders of public debt securities.13
3. CLÁUSULAS PÉTREAS – THE BRAZILIAN UNAMENDABILITY 
CLAUSES
The Brazilian Constitution was the result of a process of plurality and disputes.14 
It states the possibility of constitutional amendments with a simple procedure: the pro-
posal has to be approved in two rounds by the Two Houses (Senate and Chamber of 
10  MARIANO, Cynara Monteiro. Emenda constitucional 95/2016 e o teto dos gastos públicos: Brasil de volta 
ao estado de exceção econômico e ao capitalismo do desastre. Revista de Investigações Constitucionais, 
Curitiba, vol. 4, n. 1, p. 259-281, jan./abr. 2017. p. 261.
11  MARIANO, Cynara Monteiro. Emenda constitucional 95/2016 e o teto dos gastos públicos: Brasil de volta 
ao estado de exceção econômico e ao capitalismo do desastre. Revista de Investigações Constitucionais, 
Curitiba, vol. 4, n. 1, p. 259-281, jan./abr. 2017. p. 267.
12  MARIANO, Cynara Monteiro. Emenda constitucional 95/2016 e o teto dos gastos públicos: Brasil de volta 
ao estado de exceção econômico e ao capitalismo do desastre. Revista de Investigações Constitucionais, 
Curitiba, vol. 4, n. 1, p. 259-281, jan./abr. 2017. p. 276.
13  ROCHA, Flávia Rebecca Fernandes; MACÁRIO, Epitácio. O impacto da EC 95/2016 e da PEC 287/2016 para a 
Previdência Social brasileira. SER Social, Brasília, v. 18, n. 39, p. 444-460, jul.-dez./2016. p. 447.
14  On the process of the constitution-drafting, see ROSENN, Keith S. Brazil’s New Constitution: An Exercise in 
Transient Constitutionalism for a Transitional Society. The American Journal of Comparative Law, vol. 38, n. 
4, 773-802, autumn. 1990. p. 775-777.
41
Conventionality control and Amendment 95/2016: a Brazilian case of unconstitutional constitutional amendment
Revista de Investigações Constitucionais, Curitiba, vol. 5, n. 2, p. 9-33, maio/ago. 2018.evista e I vesti ações o stit cio ais, Curitiba, vol. 5, n. 2, p. 35-56, aio/ago. 2018.
Deputies) with a qualified quorum (3/5 of each).15 However, it is impossible to change 
the constitutional core: the so-called cláusulas pétreas, or stone clauses. These clauses 
give a list of unamendable themes. Article 60, paragraph 4, states that 
“No proposal of amendment shall be considered which is aimed at abolishing: 
I – the federative form of State; II – the direct, secret, universal and periodic vote; III – the 
separation of the Government Powers; IV – individual rights and guarantees.” There are 
basic constitutional principles of the Brazilian constitutional order. As Prof. Salgado no-
tes, “These entrenched clauses represent the essence of a hard constitutionalism. They 
reflect the heart of political decisions that demanded a new constitutional moment, a 
refounding of the state. (…) The permanence of the immutable spine in the constitu-
tion depends on the respect for the rules of constitutional reforms, normally ensured 
by judicial review.”16 In addition to assuring the immutability of certain values, as well as 
preserving the identity and continuity of the constitutional project, these clauses also 
share the inalterable essence of this project. To eliminate a concrete clause means dimi-
nishing the basic principles guaranteed by the original constituent power.17 The stone 
clauses are an expression of self-commitment, whereby popular sovereignty limits its 
power in the future to protect democracy against the destructive effect of passions, 
interests and temptation.18 The cláusulas pétreas – meaning ‘stone clauses’ or ‘petrous 
clauses’ – to express their rigidity, cannot block or limit extra-constitutional changes by 
a completely new constitution-making process since, as one of us written elsewhere 
“even rocks cannot withstand the volcanic outburst of the primary constituent power.”19 
However, they can block constitutional amendments. And in Brazil, like in several other 
countries, the unamendable provision is enforced through substantive judicial review 
of constitutional amendments, aimed to ensure that the constitutional amendment 
power does not exceed its limits.20 True, while the Constitution does not entrench an 
15  On the constitutional amendment procedure in Brazil, see MAIA, Luciano. The Creation and Amending Pro-
cess in the Brazilian Constitution. In: ANDENAS, Mads (Ed.). The Creation and Amendment of Constitutional 
Norms. London: The British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 2000. p. 54- 86.
16  SALGADO, Eneida Desiree. Brazilian Legislators at Work: Constitutional Amendments as Electoral Strategy. 
Election Law Journal, Vol. 16, Num. 2, p. 325-333, jun. 2017. p. 328.
17  MENDES, Gilmar Ferreira; BRANCO, Paulo Gustavo Gonet. Curso de direito constitucional. 9. ed. rev. e 
atual. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2014. p. 123.
18  On the expressive and functional aims of unamendable provisions see ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Hand-
cuffs. Arizona State Law Journal, vol. 42, num. 3, p. 663-715, 2010, p. 663; ALBERT, Richard. The expressive func-
tion of constitutional amendment rules. Revista de Investigações Constitucionais, Curitiba, vol. 2, n. 1, p. 7-64, 
jan./abr. 2015. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5380/rinc.v2i1.43100; ROZNAI, Yaniv. Unamendability and the Genetic 
Code of the Constitution. European Review of Public Law, vol. 27, num. 2, summer 2015. p. 775-825.  
19  ROZNAI, Yaniv. Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments – The Limits of Amendment Powers. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. p. 129. 
20  On judicial review of constitutional amendments in Brazil, see MENDES, Conrado Hübner, Judicial Review 
of Constitutional Amendments in the Brazilian Supreme Court. Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 
17, num. 3, dec.2005. p. 449-461.  For a comparative and theoretical exploration of judicial enforcement of 
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explicit authority of judicial review of constitutional amendments, as the Supreme 
Federal Court’s power goes only as far as the authority to invalidate “federal or state 
law or normative acts” (Article 102, I, a), since 1993 the Court itself declared that it has 
an  inherent power to review the constitutionality even of constitutional amendments 
approved by Congress.21  This can be done after an amendment has been promulgated, 
in concrete cases, by any judge, and also by the Supreme Court in an abstract control 
through direct action of unconstitutionality.22
Since Article 60, paragraph 4 protects general constitutional principles that are 
open to varied interpretations, when analysing the constitutionality of constitutional 
amendments one has to define what is the protected content of the immutable clauses; 
“The mainstream answers usually consist of extensive interpretations of these restric-
tion clauses, and depending on the conception of democracy they are based on, they 
can be detrimental to democracy itself.”23
Does Amendment 95/2016 violate the stone clauses? If appears that in the 
analyzed case, there are two clauses that are allegedly violated by the amendment: Sta-
te’s federalist form and fundamental rights. As the tax changes influence the autonomy 
of the government and can mean a great cutback on Brazilian’s investments on public 
policies, these two cláusulas pétreas are at risk of being infringed.
To be considered invalidated by a violation of the material limit to the constitu-
tional amendment power, an amendment will have to affect the essential nucleus of 
the federative principle, depriving the state entity of substantive powers, depriving it 
of autonomy or impeding its participation in the formation of the federal will.24 In other 
words, if the amendment gravely infringes division of powers between the parts of the 
Federation, the autonomy of each one of them or participation in the formation of the 
will of this entity, it would violates the characterization of federalism – and therefore 
violates the unamendable clauses.
The ultimate meaning of the immutability clauses is to prevent an “erosion” pro-
cess of the Constitution.25 In view of that, the Constitution prohibits not only amend-
unamendability see ROZNAI, Yaniv. Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments – The Limits of Amend-
ment Powers. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. p. 179-225. 
21  SALGADO, Eneida Desiree. Brazilian Legislators at Work: Constitutional Amendments as Electoral Strategy. 
Election Law Journal, Vol. 16, Num. 2, 2017. p. 329.
22  MENDES, Gilmar Ferreira; BRANCO, Paulo Gustavo Gonet. Curso de direito constitucional. 9. ed. rev. e 
atual. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2014. p. 126.
23  SALGADO, Eneida Desiree. Brazilian Legislators at Work: Constitutional Amendments as Electoral Strategy. 
Election Law Journal, Vol. 16, Num. 2, 2017. p. 328. On the idea of democracy, see: SALGADO, Eneida Desiree. 
Essay on the constitutional promises of democracy and republic. Revista de Investigações Constitucionais, 
Curitiba, vol. 4, n. 3. p. 85-100, set./dez. 2017. DOI: 10.5380/rinc.v4i3.54373.
24  BARROSO, Luís Roberto. Curso de Direito Constitucional Contemporâneo. 4. ed. São Paulo: Saraiva, 
2013. p. 193. 
25  MENDES, Gilmar Ferreira; BRANCO, Paulo Gustavo Gonet. Curso de direito constitucional. 9. ed. rev. e 
atual. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2014. p. 123.
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ments that expressly state they aim to abolish one or more of the clauses of Article 60, 
but also any amendment that modifies a conceptual element of these clauses. Accor-
dingly, if the amendment derogates from the States their capacity of self-organization, 
self-government and self-administration, for example, it would violate federalism and 
accordingly, would be considered as violating a cláusula pétrea.26 
Concerning the violation of fundamental rights, it can be said that prima fa-
cie Amendment 95/2016 is an unconstitutional change to the Brazilian Constitution. 
Following the same standard as the violation of Federalism, Article 60, paragraph 4, 
prohibits proposing constitutional amendments that aim at abolishing individual ri-
ghts and guarantees. Title II of the Constitution provides a long list of fundamental ri-
ghts and guarantees, within which chapter I lists individual and collective rights, chap-
ter II lists social rights, chapter III concerns nationality, and chapter IV lists political rights 
(chapter V concerns political parties). Through its jurisprudence, the Brazilian Constitu-
tional Court extended the unamendability protection of right to almost all constitutio-
nal rights that protect or advantage individual to also include socio-economic rights. 
As Justice Carlos Velloso stated: “Individual rights and guarantees ... are spread through 
the Constitution. ... It is known today that the doctrine of fundamental rights is not 
restricted to individual rights and guarantees but also social rights and guarantees re-
latively to nationality and political rights. Today we do not speak only about individual 
rights or first generation rights. We speak about first, second, third and even fourth 
generation of rights.”27
The unamendability prohibits abolishing rights. Thus, if the amendment aims 
to include more fundamental rights or improve the protection of existing rights there 
is no violation of cláusulas pétreas. On the examined case, what happens is the oppo-
site: reducing considerably the amounts of public spending on social programs and 
public policies leads inevitably to a stage of violation of fundamental rights and, conse-
quently, violates these clauses. 
Now, not every violation of an unamendable principle or right would be consi-
dered as unconstitutional: “Unamendability is not aimed at preventing minor changes 
that contradict unamendable principles or deviate from them. Its main function is to 
preserve the constitutional order and protect against revolutionary changes. Also, it 
ensures that amendments do not destroy the constitution so that it is replaced with 
a new one. Unamendability thus applies to those extraordinary and exceptional cir-
cumstances in which the constitutional change strikes at the heart of the constitution’s 
basic principles, depriving them of their minimal conditions of existence. The impact 
26  SILVA, José Afonso da. Curso de Direito Constitucional Positivo. 32. ed. São Paulo: Malheiros, 2008. p. 67.
27  ADI 939/93 DF, p. 275. cited in MOHALLEM, Michael Freitas.  Immutable clauses and judicial review in In-
dia, Brazil and South Africa: expanding constitutional courts’ authority. The International Journal of Human 
Rights, vol. 15, n. 5, p. 765-786, jun. 2011. p. 773. 
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of the conflict between the amendment and the unamendable basic principle must 
be of such intensity, and to such an extent, that it modifies the principle’s essence.”28 It 
must be considered as not merely affecting the unamendable right but fundamentally 
abandoning it. 
Indeed, it appears that this amendment is not a mere minor contradiction of 
protected fundamental rights but a deliberative disassemble of one of the constitu-
tion’s elemental parts. Richard Albert describes this phenomenon as a ‘constitutional 
dismemberment’. As he writes particularly with regard to Amendment 95/2016: “Bra-
zil….has recently completed a successful effort to dismember a constitutional right. … 
The realization of social rights is likely to be severely compromised with the spending 
cap now in force. This is not a change of modest proportion; it will impact an entire ge-
neration and its effects could reverberate far beyond that period. … The impact of this 
Public Spending Cap Amendment on the next generation of social rights enjoyment 
in Brazil combined with how directly it undermines the Constitution’s founding and 
continuing commitment to the social rights suggests that it may be more than a simple 
amendment. Its purpose and effect suggest that it should instead be called a consti-
tutional dismemberment.”29 The gravity of the violation appears to one that the test of 
fundamental abandonment of the previously protected rights. 
For those who consider Amendment 95/2016 as constitutional, it is seen as a con-
sequence of the democratic principle. The ones that agree with the basis of the Amend-
ment believe that the change is in accordance with the Brazilian stone clauses and that 
it can give a balance in public expenses. Since the public funds are limited, so should be 
the public spending – and the Amendment would work on this matter, insuring that the 
amount of money the State puts into its activities does not exceed its incomes. Moreover, 
the process of approval of the Amendment observed due process of law and is therefore 
legitimate. The observance of the principle of equilibrium of the public spending is also 
constitutional value, therefore the aprioristic imputation of problems in the proposition 
of limits for the public expenses cannot be considered as valid.30
Advocates of the amendment also understand that assuming as premise that 
the construction of the budget can be uncompromising with the fiscal balance enter 
a frontal collision with the principle of balanced budget. It is necessary to take into ac-
count both the stone clauses and the balanced budget that also has symbiotic relations 
with the democratic principle as a guarantee of transparency and legitimacy in relation 
28  ROZNAI, Yaniv. Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments – The Limits of Amendment Powers. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. p. 222. 
29  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendment and Dismemberment. Yale Journal of International Law, 
vol. 43, forthcoming 2018, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2875931
30  VALLE, Vanice Regina Lírio do. Novo Regime Fiscal, autonomia financeira e separação de poderes: uma 
leitura em favor de sua constitucionalidade. Revista de Investigações Constitucionais, Curitiba, vol. 4, n. 1, 
p. 227-258, jan./abr. 2017. p. 251-252.
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to the sensu lato State action programs. For these constitutionalists, transparency and 
balance of public spending are as important as the stone clauses. 
Given the unequivocal finiteness of public resources, the ones that argue for the 
constitutionality of the Amendment believe that social programs can only be assured 
considering the amount of the State’s incomes. The public spending – even if it aims to 
guarantee fundamental rights – cannot exceed the amount of earnings.31
The new article 105 of the Transitional Constitutional Provisions Act establishes 
a prohibition on any legal disputes arising from the new tax regime, providing that 
prohibitions introduced by the new tax regime will not constitute an obligation of fu-
ture payment by the Union or the rights of others on the treasury. This provision is con-
trary to the constitutional principle of infeasibility of judicial control, which also consti-
tutes a stone clause, written in article 5, XXXV, of the Brazilian Constitution.32
The Brazilian Supreme Court, when considering the request for injunction in MS 
34.448-MC/DF (writ of mandamus), which objected to the suspension of the procedure 
of the former Proposal of Constitutional Amendment 241, denied the precautionary 
protection. The grounds of the decision were summarized denial of injury to the sepa-
ration of powers, guaranteed voting, secret, direct, universal and periodic and the right 
of access to the Judiciary for the purpose of preserving the remuneration structure of 
public servants. The Court has not yet considered the merits of the proposal. 
 Although there are defenders of the Amendment 95, it is important to re-
cognize that a supposed balance in public spending cannot be a reason for violating 
the Constitution. A research conducted by Institute of Applied Economic Research 
(IPEA) shows that the current rule of application of resources in actions and public he-
alth services by the federal government establishes that in 2016 the minimum applica-
tion should be 13.2% of the current net income, up to 15.0% of the current net income 
by 2020. Assuming that this rule was valid as from 2003, and the amount equivalent to 
13.2% of 2002 to calculate the minimum for that year, the loss between 2003 and 2015 
would have been R$ 257 billion compared to the application made in the period.33 It is 
clear that health care will be precarious over the next twenty years in Brazil.
Regarding the public assistance for persons with disabilities, the Brazilian go-
vernment created a program called “Benefício de Prestação Continuada”, or BPC, (trans-
lated as “Uninterrupted Provision Benefit”). This program aims to cover the necessities 
of disabled ones, providing them with a monthly minimum wage – so they can live in 
31  VALLE, Vanice Regina Lírio do. Novo Regime Fiscal, autonomia financeira e separação de poderes: uma 
leitura em favor de sua constitucionalidade., Curitiba, vol. 4, n. 1, p. 227-258, jan./abr. 2017. p. 255.
32  Art. 5, XXXV of the Brazilian Constitution provides that “the law shall not exclude any injury or threat to a 
right from the consideration of the Judicial Power.” 
33  VIEIRA, Fabiola Sulpino; BENEVIDES, Rodrigo Pucci Sá e. Os impactos do novo regime fiscal para o finan-
ciamento do Sistema Único de Saúde e para a efetivação do direito à saúde no Brasil. Brasília: IPEA, 2016. 
(Nota Técnica 28).
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dignity. As the social security’s budget will also be affected because of the changes 
promoted by the Amendment, this spending will suffer with the consequences of the 
New Tax Regime as well. Brazil has ratified the UN Convention on the rights of persons 
with disabilities and has approved its entering on the legal system on the same basis as 
a Constitutional Amendment. This issue will be analysed in the following section. 
The BPC program is of a great importance for people with disabilities, as it gua-
rantees a minimum of dignity and a regular income despite if they are working or not, 
meaning they can live without the instability of lost of jobs and other problems caused 
by economic crises. With the reduction of the program, many of these people will be left 
without State’s assistance. This social regression is counter to the Brazilian legal system’s 
implicit clause of non-regression (or non-retrogression). The principle of non-regression, 
according to the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, obliges the au-
thorities of the state not to adopt measures, policies or rules that would reduce, unjus-
tifiably, the level or status of social rights and benefits grated to the public.34 Surely, if 
one considers the principle of non-regression as absolute, this amendment, which has a 
profound retrogressive effects on social order, would be considered inadmissible. Howe-
ver, even if one considers the principle of non-regression to be of a relative nature – as we 
believe it is ought to be construed –Amendment 95/2016 would not result in a “minor 
setback”, allowed on exceptional circumstances, but in a major disproportionate harm.35
After analyzing the content of the Amendment 95/2016 and Brazilian legal sys-
tem, it appears clear that this new provisions violate the original Constituents’ project 
and represent a setback on fundamental rights, in contrast with the guarantees of the 
cláusulas pétreas. Aside the legal question, there is also the question of political deci-
sions whether a vice-president elevated to the status of president by an impeachment 
could then impose a new fiscal regime that represents, as Amendment 95/2016 does, 
a political-constitutional reform diametrically opposed to the original constitutional 
project of 1988.36
4. CONVENTIONALITY CONTROL AS AN ALTERNATIVE
In this section we would like to suggest an alternative for evaluating the cons-
titutional amendment through a ‘conventionality control’, i.e., evaluating whether a 
34  SCHWARZ, Rodrigo Garcia. On Social Rights: Some Premises for a New Approach. American International 
Journal of Social Science, vol. 15, n. 1, p.20-30, feb. 2016, p. 28.
35  On Absolute and relative perspectives of the “non-regression” principle see MAIA, Matheus Medeiros; 
MOURA, Rafael Soares Duarte. Analysis of the (Im)Possibility of Social Retrogression in the Brazilian Constitu-
tional Order. Sociology Study, vol. 5, n. 11, p. 875-882, nov. 2015. p. 878. 
36  MARIANO, Cynara Monteiro. Emenda constitucional 95/2016 e o teto dos gastos públicos: Brasil de volta 
ao estado de exceção econômico e ao capitalismo do desastre. Revista de Investigações Constitucionais, 
Curitiba, vol. 4, n. 1, p. 259-281, jan./abr. 2017. p. 279-280.
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constitutional or sub-constitutional norm is in accordance with international commit-
ments to which the country is obliged. This evaluation seems adequate since even if 
limitations on constituent power from the perspective of constitutional law are proble-
matic, from the perspective of international law they are trite.37
Regarding international law and their entry into the Brazilian legal order, arti-
cle 5 paragraph 3 of the Constitution states that international treaties and conventions 
on human rights approved in each House of the National Congress in two rounds, by 
three fifths of the votes of the respective members, shall be equivalent to constitutional 
amendments. In other words, they carry a constitutional status.  
An important part of Brazilian legal theorists dictates that the human rights 
foreseen in international conventions would configure not only norms of constitutio-
nal value, but also concrete clauses. At first, this thesis did not obtain adhesion of the 
Brazilian Federal Supreme Court as several times rejected constitutional status to the 
individual rights foreseen in conventions such as the Pact of San José. Constitutional 
Amendment 45/2004 changed it by stating that the international conventions on hu-
man rights approved in each House of the Brazilian National Congress in two rounds, 
for three fifths of the votes of the respective members, shall be equivalent to the Cons-
titutional Amendments. Thus, the Supreme Court started to admit this constitutional 
status of international conventions on human rights.38
Brazil has ratified the UN Convention on the rights of persons with disabilities 
following the procedure of article 5 paragraph 3 of the Constitution. This means that 
the Convention integrates Brazilian law on the same level as a Constitutional Amend-
ment and has the same hierarchy as constitutional law. Article 19 of the Convention is 
especially relevant to the matter. It states the necessity of living independently - which 
relates to the BCP strategy. Also, Article 28 protects an adequate standard of living and 
social protection, considering it necessary to ensure access to assistance from the State, 
including financial assistance, to people with disabilities.
Moreover, as Professor Philip Alston, the current UN Special Rapporteur on extre-
me poverty and human rights, remarked, the Amendment 95/2016 violates the Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as it “has all the characteristics 
of a ‘deliberately retrogressive measure’” and “will undoubtedly result in retrogression 
with regard to the realization of economic and social rights”.39 Alston notes that auste-
37  CAHIN, Gérard. Limitation du pouvoir constituant: le point de vue de l’internationaliste. Civitas Europa, 
Vol. 32, p. 55-79, 2014. 
38  MENDES, Gilmar Ferreira; BRANCO, Paulo Gustavo Gonet. Curso de direito constitucional. 9. ed. rev. e 
atual. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2014. p. 130.
39  ALSTON, Philip. Some reflections on Brazil’s approach to promoting austerity through a constitutional 
amendment. Remarks prepared for presentation at a colloquium on constitutional austerity, p. 1, Sao Paulo, 
October 3, 2017. Available at: <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Poverty/Austeritystatement_Alsto-
n3Oct2017.pdf>. Access on: 30.12.2017. 
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rity measure must be of a temporary nature to the duration of a crisis only and that the 
government had not satisfactory showed that it comprehensively examined alternative 
measures and that the proposed measure is necessary and proportionate.40  
The country is obliged on a regional level by the American Convention on Hu-
man Rights (the Pact of San José, Costa Rica). This international compromise puts Bra-
zil into the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ jurisdiction, and also obliged the 
country to respect the rights protected in the Convention, such as human dignity and 
the necessity of progressive development. Both of those provisions are clearly being 
infringed by Amendment 95/2016. 
The Inter-American Court has recognized the possibility of conventionality con-
trol of countries’ norms that violate regional conventions.41 Conventionality control is as 
a highly effective tool for the respect, assurance and enforcement of the rights described 
in the Convention.42 It guarantees compatibility of local norm with international norms.43
As previously shown, the Brazilian New Tax Regime violates compromises rati-
fied by the country not only on a global level, but also on a regional one. The judicial 
control of conventionality advocated by the Inter-American Court appears as a legal 
mechanism by which judges invalidate rules of hierarchy inferior to the convention, 
40  ALSTON, Philip. Some reflections on Brazil’s approach to promoting austerity through a constitution-
al amendment. Remarks prepared for presentation at a colloquium on constitutional austerity, p. 4, Sao Paulo, 
October 3, 2017. Available at: <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Poverty/Austeritystatement_Alsto-
n3Oct2017.pdf>. Access on: 30.12.2017. 
41  See generally OSWALDO, Ruiz-Chiriboga. The Conventionality Control: Examples of (Un)Successful Expe-
riences in Latin America. Inter-American and European Human Rights Journal, vol 3, n. 1 & 2, p. 200. 2010; 
DULITZKY, Ariel E. An inter-american constitutional court the invention of the conventionality control by the 
inter-american court of human rights. Texas International Law Journal, vol. 50, n. 1, p. 45-94. 2015; MAC-GRE-
GOR, Eduardo Ferrer. Conventionality Control the New Doctrine of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 
American Journal of International Law Unbound, vol 109. p. 93. 2015; CONTESSE, Jorge. The International 
Authority if the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: a critique of the conventionality control doctrine. The 
International Journal of Human Rights. forthcoming 2018. 
42  SAGÜES, Nestor Pedro. Obligaciones internacionales y control de convencionalidad. Estudios Consti-
tucionales, ano 8, n. 1, p. 117-136, 2010. Available at: <http://www.cecoch.cl/docs/pdf/revista_ano8_1_2010/
articulo_4.pdf>. Access on: 18.11.2017; SAGÜÉS, Nestor Pedro. Nuevas fronteras del control de convencionali-
dad: el reciclaje del derecho nacional y el control legisferante de convencionalidad. Revista de Investigações 
Constitucionais, Curitiba, vol. 1, n. 2, p. 23-32, maio/ago. 2014. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5380/rinc.v1i2.40509; 
HERNÁNDEZ-MENDIBLE, Victor Rafael. El control de convencionalidad como expresión del control de consti-
tucionalidad: originalidad y desaciertos. Revista de Investigações Constitucionais, Curitiba, vol. 2, n. 3, p. 
137-168, set./dez. 2015.  DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5380/rinc.v2i3.44532.
43  LEAL, Mônia Clarissa Hennig; ALVES, Felipe Dalenogare.  O controle de convencionalidade e o Judiciário 
brasileiro: a sua aplicação pelo Tribunal Superior do Trabalho como forma de proteger a dignidade da mão-
de-obra (vedação de terceirização de atividade-fim) no case Carneiro Távora v. Telemar Norte Leste e Contax. 
Revista de Investigações Constitucionais, Curitiba, vol. 4, n. 1, p.  109-128, jan./abr. 2017. DOI: 10.5380/rinc.
v4i1.48212; ALIANAK, Raquel Cynthia. El renovado Derecho Administrativo, a la luz del control de convencio-
nalidad. A&C – Revista de Direito Administrativo & Constitucional, Belo Horizonte, ano 15, n. 59, p. 29-46, 
jan./mar. 2015; SANTOS, Gustavo Ferreira; TEIXEIRA, João Paulo Allain. Diálogo entre tribunais e proteção de 
direitos humanos: dificuldades e perspectivas. A&C – Revista de Direito Administrativo & Constitucional, 
Belo Horizonte, ano 16, n. 66, p. 267-282, out./dez. 2016. DOI: 10.21056/aec.v16i66.369.
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which have not been dictated in conformity with it, taking into account not only the 
Convention itself, but interpretation made by the Inter-American Court.44 Since the 
Amendment 95/2016 violates not only the Brazilian cláusulas pétreas, but also interna-
tional law, it should be considered in incongruity with the international compromises 
taken by the country regarding both the Inter-American Convention and the UN Con-
vention on the rights of persons with disabilities. 
Brazil, as any other state, must comply with its international law obligations and 
cannot absolve itself from its international legal obligations by reference to its domes-
tic constitutional law. This is a matter of customary international law as reflected in Art. 
27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. From the perspective of internatio-
nal law, clearly it is superior domestic law, even constitutional law, Accordingly, supra-
national law may pose limitations to constitutional amendments.45 Not only that, but 
international human rights may act as a supra-constitutional reference in judicially re-
viewing constitutional norms as it is clear, precise, has effective judicial review mecha-
nisms through supra-national human rights bodies, and is even procedurally accessible 
by often allowing individual petitions.46 
However, the challenge is that the principle of the superiority of supranational 
law over domestic constitutional law only means that constitutional norms cannot be 
a ground for excusing a state’s responsibility. Therefore, in a conflict between an inter-
national standard and an internal constitutional standard, the latter can be declared 
unenforceable and the state can be found responsible. Nevertheless, such unenfor-
ceability only applies in the international sphere but the constitutional norm would 
still be valid under domestic national law.47 As André Nollkaemper writes, “the claim to 
supremacy of international law is confined to the international level. It is at that level 
that states cannot invoke domestic law to justify the non-performance with an interna-
tional obligation and it is at that level that international courts, by virtue of their esta-
blishment under international law, have to give precedence to international law over 
domestic law. This has no necessary legal consequences domestically ... The general 
understanding is that international law cannot itself realize supremacy at the domestic 
level.”48 However, what can be the role of domestic courts? 
44  SCHEPIS, Marcelo. La influencia de los tratados internacionales en el derecho interno. El control de con-
vencionalidad. XXV Congreso Nacional de Derecho Procesal. Buenos Aires, 11-13 nov. 2009. Available at: 
<http://www.procesal2009bsas.com.ar/ponencias-consti-proceso.html>. Access on:  18.11.2017.
45  ROZNAI, Yaniv. The Theory and Practice of ‘Supra-Constitutional’ Limits on Constitutional Amendments. 
International and comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 62, n. 3, p. 557-597, 2013. p. 577-580. 
46  GARLICKI, Lech; GARLICKA, Zofia A. External Review of Constitutional Amendments? International Law as a 
Norm of Reference. Israel Law Review, vol. 44, n. 3, p. 343-368, 2011. p. 359-363.
47  GÖZLER, Kemal. La Question de la Superiorité des Normes de Droit international sur la Constitution. Anka-
ra Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi, vol. 46, n. 1-4, p. 195-211, 1996, p. 200. 
48  NOLLKAEMPER, Andre. National Courts and the International Rule of Law, Oxford University Press, 2012, 
p. 199-200.
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Domestic courts can assume an important role “to review the legality of national 
acts in the light of international obligations and to ensure rule-conformity”.49 They can, 
in other words, ‘domesticate’ the supremacy of international law. As developed by the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, control of conventionality should be conduc-
ted by domestic judges would become guardians of the convention: “when a State has 
ratified an international treaty … the judges are also subject to it; this obliges them to 
ensure that the effect utile of the Convention is not reduced or annulled by the applica-
tion of laws contrary to its provisions, object and purpose. In other words, the organs of 
the Judiciary should exercise not only a control of constitutionality but also of ‘conven-
tionality’ ex officio between domestic norms and the American Convention.”50 
The obvious problem of course is that when an international obligation contra-
dicts the constitution itself, courts would tend to defer to the national constitution.51 As 
a constituted organ, the judiciary must abide by the national constitution, the ‘supreme 
law of the land’. That is especially when the contradiction is may explicit at the consti-
tutional level.52 
However, arguably, governed by the principle of pro homine domestic courts 
should prioritize instruments of international human right law even over explicit na-
tional constitutions when the former are more favorable to human beings and provi-
de a better protection to persons.53 As Ximena Fuentes Torrijo stated, “if international 
law does not provide tools for preventing States from enacting norms incompatible 
with treaties, then, the solution should be sought within domestic law … domestic 
legislation should not be allowed to untie what have been tied through the incorpo-
ration of international law into domestic law. In order to achieve this, rules contained 
in international treaties had to be placed somewhere beyond the reach of domestic 
law. How can this be accomplished? By placing international treaties at a higher level 
49  NOLLKAEMPER, Andre. National Courts and the International Rule of Law, Oxford University Press, 2012, 
p. 10.
50  IACtHR, Case of the Dismissed Congressional Employees (Aguado-Alfaro et al.) v. Peru, Judgment (Prelim-
inary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs), 24 November 2006, para. 128; cited in NEGISHI, Yota. The Pro 
Homine Principle’s Role in Regulating the Relationship between Conventionality Control and Constitutionality 
Control. European Journal of International Law, vol. 28, n. 2, p. 457-482, 2017, p. 458. 
51  See e.g.  the Rafael Chavero Gazdik case, Sala Constitucional del Tribunal Supremo de Justicia de Venezuela, 
Sentencia no.  1942/2013, 13 November 2003, in which the Supreme Court of Venezuela held that if interna-
tional court decisions contradict the national constitution they should not be executed. Cited in NEGISHI, Yota. 
The Pro Homine Principle’s Role in Regulating the Relationship between Conventionality Control and Constitu-
tionality Control. European Journal of International Law, vol. 28, n. 2, p. 457-482, 2017, p. 462.
52  See SCJN, Sentencia 293/2011, Contradicción de Tesis 293/2011, 3 September 2013, at 64–65, in which the 
Mexican Supreme Court held that is such cases the Constitution has the priority; cited in NEGISHI, Yota. The Pro 
Homine Principle’s Role in Regulating the Relationship between Conventionality Control and Constitutionality 
Control. European Journal of International Law, vol. 28, n. 2, p. 457-482, 2017, p. 475. 
53  NEGISHI, Yota. The Pro Homine Principle’s Role in Regulating the Relationship between Conventionality 
Control and Constitutionality Control. European Journal of International Law, vol. 28, n. 2, p. 457-482, 2017, 
p. 474.
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internally.”54 Judicial prioritization of certain international human rights rules that pro-
tect and advance rights better than the constitution would provide such international 
obligations a supra-constitutional status. It would materialize the understanding of 
“convention rights as minimum constitutional guarantees” which limit constitutional 
rule-making.55 
This seems particularly feasible in light of the ‘stone clause’. True, when natio-
nal courts are asked to enforce international law vis-à-vis a contradictory constitutional 
amendment, they face “mixed loyalties”, in which case the national judge will usually 
prefer the national constitutional law over international law. It is here, that the constitu-
tional unamendability can strengthen judicial enforcement of international law. When 
the constitution protects individual rights and guarantees through an unamendable 
stone clause, this could provide the national judge with domestic anchoring and the 
legal legitimacy in order to protect international human rights obligation and prioritize 
it over conflicting constitutional amendments. In other words, “limitations within the 
constitution itself may be used in order to render supranational standards valid limita-
tions on the amendment powers.”56  In that respect, taking together the cláusulas pé-
treas and international human rights conventions to which Brazil is obliged strengthen 
the claim that the Amendment is unconstitutional/unconventional and that domestic 
court can invalidate it. The whole is greater than the sum of its parts. 
5. CONCLUSION
Our analysis shows that the Brazilian Constitution of 1988 is a result of a de-
mocratic process that is committed with human dignity, fundamental rights and the 
provision of a number of public policies by the State. The constituent power imposed 
a number of pre-compromises – the cláusulas pétras – stipulated in article 60 paragra-
ph 4 of the Constitution. State’s federalism; direct, secret, universal and periodic vote; 
separation of powers; and individual rights and guarantees are the protected themes. 
Any change made on Brazilian Constitution cannot tend to abolish any one of those.
Despite this provision, the country’s Legislative has approved Amendment 
95/2016, stating a New Tax Regime, freezing public spending and imposing a difficult 
situation for public managers, since the only variation on the expenses will be the 
54  TORRIJO, Ximena Fuentes. International and Domestic Law: Definitely and Odd Couple. Revista Juridica 
UPR, vol.77, n. 2, p. 483-505, 2008, p. 491. 
55  ALTWICKER, Tilmann. Convention Rights as Minimum Constitutional Guarantees? The Conflict between 
Domestic Constitutional Law and the European Convention on Human Rights. In: BOGDANDY, Armin von; 
SONNEVEND, Pál (Eds.). Constitutional Crisis in the European Constitutional Area - Theory, Law and Poli-
tics in Hungary and Romania. Oxford and Portland Oregon, Hart Publishing, 2015. p. 344–363.
56  ROZNAI, Yaniv. The Theory and Practice of ‘Supra-Constitutional’ Limits on Constitutional Amendments. 
International and comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 62, n. 3, p. 557-597, 2013. p. 596.
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economic inflation for the year. From 2017 to 2036, Brazilian’s public policies will not be 
able to grow – which means a great recession and a decrease of social programs and 
State’s actions. 
This Amendment disrespects both the cláusula pétrea regarding State’s federa-
list form (since it imposes an amount of spending and does not give the states the 
necessary autonomy on instituting their own public programs) and fundamental rights 
(because public policies focused on these rights will be unable to grow for 20 years). 
Brazil has international commitments of human rights on a regional level, having 
ratified the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, and also on an international 
one. It is important to consider that, on an exception economic state, the first ones to su-
ffer are the ones who need more. The BPC, provision payed to people with disabilities to 
ensure a minimum of dignity, is a program risking to be severely affected by these expen-
se cuts. Since Brazil has signed the UN Convention on the right of persons with disabilities 
– and that it specifically states the need of financial aid for these people – it is evident that 
the Amendment 95/2016 violates this international commitment. Furthermore, its retro-
gressive effect on the realization of economic and social rights infringes the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Accordingly, Amendment 95/2016 is 
unconventional considering the Conventions mentioned previously. Moreover, the New 
Tax Regime violates an explicit provision of the Pact of San Jose, that is, the prohibition 
of social setbacks. Thus, an alternative for solving the unconstitutionality of que Amend-
ment is conventionality control – even by domestic judges. 
The cláusula pétrea taken together with international obligations lead to the 
conclusion that Amendment 95/2016, a political decision taken by a government wi-
thout democratic legitimacy (since it ascended to power through an impeachment 
and introduced a different government program), is unconstitutional for its attempt to 
change the Constitutional project of a Social State and its disregard for the country’s 
international human rights obligations. 
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